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TAXATION
Craig D. Bell *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews significant recent developments in the law
affecting Virginia taxation. Each section covers legislative
changes, judicial decisions, and selected opinions or pronounce-
ments from the Virginia Department of Taxation and the Attor-
ney General of Virginia over the past year. Part One of this ar-
ticle discusses legal developments regarding taxes imposed and
administered by the Commonwealth. Section II addresses
changes made to Virginia corporate and individual tax law, Sec-
tion III covers legal changes pertaining to retail sales and use
taxes, and Section IV covers changes to state tax administration.
Part Two of this article documents legal developments of local
government taxes. Sections V and VI address changes to the law
regarding Virginia real and personal property taxes, respectively.
Section VII discuses a judicial decision regarding Virginia's busi-
ness professional occupation license tax. The final section, Section
VIII, addresses a variety of miscellaneous local taxes and tax ad-
ministration applicable to local government taxing authorities.
The overall purpose of this article is to provide Virginia tax and
general practitioners with a concise overview of the recent devel-
opments in Virginia taxation that will most likely impact their
practices. This article does not, however, discuss many of the nu-
merous technical legislative changes to title 58.1 of the Virginia
Code, which covers taxation.
* Partner, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, Virginia. LL.M. in Taxation, 1986, Mar-
shall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary; J.D., 1983, State University of
New York at Buffalo; M.B.A., 1980, Syracuse University; B.S., 1979, Syracuse University.
Mr. Bell practices primarily in the areas of state and local taxation, and civil and criminal
tax litigation. He is a Fellow of the American College of Tax Counsel, a Barrister of the J.
Edgar Murdock Inn of Court (U.S. Tax Court), an adjunct professor of tax law at the Col-
lege of William & Mary School of Law, and a past chair of both the Tax and Military Law
Sections of the Virginia State Bar and the Tax Section of the Virginia Bar Association.
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PART ONE: TAXES ADMINISTERED BY THE VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION
II. INCOME TAx
A. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
1. Fixed Date of Conformity
The 2009 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-301, which mandates conformity of terms to the Internal
Revenue Code, to advance Virginia's fixed date of conformity from
December 31, 2007 to December 31, 2008.1 Virginia continues,
however, to disallow the federal bonus depreciation deductions
except for any bonus depreciation allowed under Internal Reve-
nue Code section 168(n), which is designed to benefit qualified
disaster assistance property. 2 The new date of conformity enables
the state to adopt provisions from five federal tax acts adopted by
Congress since December 31, 2007. The first provision is from the
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, which increased Internal Reve-
nue Code section 179 expensing levels. The second set of provi-
sions are from the Heartland, Habitat, Harvest, and Horticulture
Act of 2008, which provided targeted tax relief to conservation
and agricultural interests.4 The third set of provisions is from the
Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008, which
provided tax benefits to those serving in the military and in the
Peace Corps.' The fourth area of conformed provisions comes from
the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, which modified certain
1. Act of Feb. 11, 2009, ch. 2, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-301(B) (Repl. Vol. 2009)); Act of Feb. 11, 2009, ch. 3, 2009 Va. Acts - (codi-
fied as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301(B) (Repl. Vol. 2009)). For additional guid-
ance, see VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, PUB. Doc 09-24 (Feb. 12, 2009), available at http://www.
policylibrary.tax.virginia.gov/OTP/policy.nsf (follow "Tax Bulletins" hyperlink; then follow
"2009" hyperlink; then follow "VTB 09-1 (PD 09-24)" hyperlink).
2. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301(B) (Repl. Vol. 2009); see generally I.R.C. § 168(n)
(West Supp. 2009).
3. Pub. L. No. 110-185, § 102, 122 Stat. 613, 618 (to be codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 179 & note).
4. Pub. L. No. 110-234, tit. XV, 122 Stat. 1484 (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of 19, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
5. Pub. L. No. 110-245, 122 Stat. 1624 (to be codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 26 U.S.C.).
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rules applicable to bonds and provides other forms of tax relief 6
Finally, the new conforming date enables the state to extend the
exclusion of discharges of principal residence indebtedness from
gross income of individuals and provided a variety of other tar-
geted tax benefits.7 If the date of conformity had not been ad-
vanced to December 31, 2008, none of the provisions of these acts
would have flowed through to Virginia taxable income.
2. Addback Created for Captive REITs
The Virginia legislature amended Virginia Code section 58.1-
402 to require a Real Estate Investment Trust ("REIT") that is
more than fifty percent owned by a corporation (a "captive REIT")
to add back any federal deduction for dividends paid by the REIT
to its shareholders. 8 This legislation was enacted to combat a
state tax minimization strategy for businesses that own a sub-
stantial amount of real property assets (i.e., national retailers
and financial institutions) who took steps to reduce their state in-
come tax in separate return states where the businesses had
business operations. The strategy called for the corporate taxpay-
er to transfer its real property assets to a subsidiary that was
qualified as a REIT under the Internal Revenue Code. The cap-
tive REIT would then lease its real property assets back to its
parent corporation, thereby creating rental expenses for the par-
ent corporation and rental income for the captive REIT. State in-
come tax liability on the captive REIT's rental income could be
eliminated to the extent that the separate return states allowed
the captive REIT to deduct the dividends that it paid to its parent
corporation and the other shareholders while also allowing the
parent corporation to claim the dividends received deduction for
the dividends that it received from the captive REIT.9 Virginia is
6. Pub. L. No. 110-289, div. C, 122 Stat. 2877 (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
7. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A,
tit. III, 122 Stat. 3765 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
8. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 426, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-402(B)(10)(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2009)); Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 558, 2009 Va. Acts
- (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-402(B)(10(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
9. Internal Revenue Code sections 856 through 860 provide a set of requirements
applicable to an entity for it to qualify as a REIT entitling the entity to qualify for the div-
idends paid deduction that confers a pass-through entity status on the REIT. See IRC
§§ 856-860 (West 2009). One of the requirements is that the REIT have 100 or more "per-
sons" owning the REIT's shares or beneficial ownership interests. Id. § 856(a)(5). A captive
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a separate return state, so this tax planning strategy could be a
viable strategy to minimize Virginia corporate income taxes. 10 If
the tax planning strategy worked, the captive REIT would not be
taxable at all in the separate return states, while the parent cor-
poration of the captive REIT would be able to deduct rental ex-
penses on its state tax returns without having to pay any state
taxes on its dividend income from the captive REIT. In other
words, the captive REIT has zero REIT taxable income because it
distributes all of its net income to its shareholders while the par-
ent is able to deduct its dividend income from the captive REIT by
means of a dividend received deduction. The result is the captive
REIT generally will not have any taxable income at the state lev-
el.11
As amended, Virginia Code section 58.1-402(B)(10) will require
a captive REIT to add back any federal deduction for dividends
paid by the REIT to its shareholders. 2 For the purposes of section
58.1-402(B)(10), a REIT is considered a captive REIT if (1) it is
not regularly traded on the securities market, (2) fifty percent or
more of the shares are owned by a taxable entity (i.e., a corpora-
tion or an association taxed as a corporation under the Internal
Revenue Code), and (3) more than twenty-five percent of its in-
come consists of rent from real property. 3 The legislature added
several statutory exceptions to the captive REIT addback provi-
sions. First, an affiliated group of REITs will not be considered
captive REITs unless a single corporate entity maintains ultimate
ownership of the group. 14 Second, entities organized under the
laws of Australia as property trusts and entities organized under
the laws of other foreign countries that are similar to REITs also
will not be considered captive REITs if they are widely held by
the public. 5 The add back provision is effective for taxable years
REIT usually will have 99 employees or officers of the parent corporation serve as share-
holders and the 100th shareholder is the parent corporation. The 100 shareholder re-
quirement in the Internal Revenue Code is designed to have the REIT not be closely held
or owned. See id. § 856(h)(1)(A).
10. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-442(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
11. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Autozone Dev. Corp., No. 2006-CA-002175-MR, 2007
Ky. App. LEXIS 401, at *10 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2007) (unpublished decision) (allowing a
REIT to claim a dividends-paid deduction to compute its state corporate income tax liabili-
ty).
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-402(B)(10)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
13. Id.
14. See id. § 58.1-402(B)(10(b)(1)-(2) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
15. Id. § 58.1-402(B)(10)(b)(3)-(4), (d) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
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beginning on or after January 1, 2009;' 6 however, it is reduced by
one-half for the 2009 and 2010 tax years.'
3. Land Preservation Tax Credit Temporarily Reduced
The 2009 General Assembly enacted legislation temporarily
reducing the maximum amount of land preservation tax credits
that may be claimed on returns for taxable years 2009 and 2010
from $100,000 to $50,000 per taxpayer. 18 In an effort to mitigate
the harm caused by this temporary reduction to taxpayers with
existing land preservation credits or to those credits earned in
2009 or 2010, the General Assembly provided two extra years, for
a total of twelve years, to carry over tax credits that cannot be
claimed as a result of this legislation. 9 Prior to this amendment,
the normal maximum land preservation tax credit carry over was
ten years. 20
4. Installment Sale Method Allowed for Certain Dispositions of
Real Property
The 2009 General Assembly enacted new Virginia Code sec-
tions 58.1-322(H) and 58.1-402(F) to allow taxpayers to recognize
income from certain dispositions of real property under the in-
stallment sale method for Virginia corporate income and personal
income tax purposes, even though taxpayers are required to re-
port the entire gain as income in the year the real property is dis-
posed of for federal income tax purposes. 2' To qualify for the elec-
16. Id. § 58.1-402(B)(10)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
17. See Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 426, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-402(B)(10)(a) ed. note (Repl. Vol. 2009)); Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 558,
2009 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-402(B)(10)(a) ed. note
(Repl. Vol. 2009)).
18. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 510, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-512(C)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2009)); Act of Feb. 23, 2009, ch. 12, 2009 Va. Acts __ (co-
dified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-512(C)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
19. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 510, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-512(C)(1), (D)(5)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2009)); Act of Feb. 23, 2009, ch. 12, 2009 Va.
Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-512(C)(1), (D)(5)(a) (Repl. Vol.
2009)).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-512(C)(1), (D)(5)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2008). For more informa-
tion on the 2009 legislative changes to the Virginia Land Preservation Tax Credit, see VA.
DEP'T OF TAXATION, PuB. DOc. 09-61 (May 6, 2009), available at httpJ/www.policylibrary.
tax.virginia.gov/OTP/policy.nsf (follow "Tax Bulletins" hyperlink; then follow "2009" hyper-
link; then follow "VTB 09-4 (PD 09-61)" hyperlink).
21. See Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 508, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA.
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tion, the real property must be disposed of on or after January 1,
2009.22 In addition, the real property must be held by the taxpay-
er for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's
trade or business.23 The election for installment sale method must
be made on or before the due date of the taxpayer's tax return for
the taxable year in which the disposition occurred (including ex-
tensions).24 The legislation also requires the Virginia Department
of Taxation to establish guidelines that set forth the conditions or
restrictions with qualifying dispositions and address the recap-
ture of income under certain circumstances. 25 The development of
these guidelines is exempt from the provisions of the Administra-
tive Process Act.26
5. Clean Fuel Vehicle Job Creation Tax Credit Expanded
The 2009 General Assembly expanded the types of fuels to
which new jobs created by a corporation seeking to qualify for the
clean fuel vehicle job creation tax credit must relate.27 The legisla-
ture amended Virginia Code section 58.1-439.1 to expand the de-
finition of eligible fuels to include fuels "derived from any cellu-
lose, hemicellulose, or lignin that is derived from renewable
biomass or algae." 2 The Code defines the types of jobs a corpora-
tion can create to quality for the credit as jobs created in either
(i) the manufacture of the major components of the energy storage,
energy supply, or engine, motor, and power train mechanisms
unique to a vehicle fueled by clean special fuels; (ii) the manufacture
of components uniquely used to convert vehicles designed to operate
on gasoline or diesel fuel to operate on clean special fuels or ad-
vanced biofuels; (iii) the conversion of vehicles designed to operate on
gasoline or diesel fuel to operate on clean special fuels or advanced
biofuels; (iv) the manufacture of vehicles designed to operate on
clean special fuels; (v) the manufacture of components designed to
CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-322(H), -402(F) (Repl. Vol. 2009)); see also I.R.C. § 453(b)(2)(A) (2006).
22. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-322(H), -402(F) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 730, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-439.1 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
28. Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 730, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-439.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
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produce, store, and dispense clean special fuels or advanced biofuels;
or (vi) the production of advanced biofuels. 29
The amount of the tax credit remains $700 for each new qualify-
ing job created in a taxable year.30 The amendments apply to tax-
able years beginning on or after January 1, 2009.11
6. Single Sales Factor for Manufacturers
The 2009 General Assembly enacted a new Virginia Code sec-
tion, section 58.1-422, to permit manufacturing companies to use
a single-factor apportionment based on sales to determine their
Virginia taxable income.35 Currently, all corporations except mo-
tor carriers, financial institutions, construction corporations, and
railway companies apportion income to Virginia by way of a
three-factor fraction.3 3 The numerator of the fraction is "the prop-
erty factor plus the payroll factor, plus twice the sales factor, and
the denominator of which is four."31 Each of the three factors-
property, payroll, and sales-are further defined in the Virginia
Code.35
The new corporate apportionment formula for manufacturers
will be based on only one factor-the sales factor--once the new
legislation is fully phased in for taxable years beginning on or af-
ter July 1, 2014.36 Prior to this date, manufacturers will be able to
use the traditional three-factor apportionment formula with a
triple-weighted sales factor for taxable years beginning on or af-
ter July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2013. 37 For taxable years be-
ginning on or after July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014, a manu-
facturer may use a quadruple-weighted sales factor.38 The statute
provides that once a manufacturer elects to use the single-factor
apportionment formula, it must use this alternative apportion-
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
30. Id.
31. See Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 730, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.1 ed. note (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
32. Act of Apr. 8, 2009, ch. 821, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-422 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
33. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-408 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
34. Id.
35. See id. §§ 58.1-409, -412, -414 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
36. See id. § 58.1-422(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
37. See id. § 58.1-422(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
38. Id. § 58.1-422(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
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ment formula for three taxable years before the election can be
revoked.3 9
Section 58.1-422 also requires an electing manufacturer to
maintain a base year level of employment in Virginia for the first
three years after the manufacturer elects to use the single-factor
apportionment formula.40 The statute defines "base year employ-
ment" as the average number of full-time employees employed by
the manufacturer in Virginia in the taxable year ending imme-
diately prior to the first taxable year in which the manufacturer
uses the single-factor apportionment formula.41 In the event the
electing manufacturer fails to maintain the base year employ-
ment levels, the new statute requires the Virginia Department of
Taxation to impose a supplemental tax assessment equal to the
difference between the taxes calculated under the traditional
three-factor apportionment formula and the new "sales only" ap-
portionment formula, plus a penalty equal to ten percent of the
additional taxes.42 Interest will accrue on the supplemental tax
assessment and penalty from the due date for filing the tax re-
turn until full payment is made.43
One interesting element of the new single-factor apportionment
formula is that the statute contains a non-severability clause.14
States often use tax incentives to entice out-of-state companies to
relocate their facility to that state, yet many lawsuits have chal-
lenged such tax incentives as violative of the United States Con-
stitution's Commerce Clause.45 In the event the new Virginia ap-
portionment formula is held to deny the election of a single-factor
formula to a company that shifts employees from Virginia to oth-
er states, a court could hold that the legislation discriminates
against an out-of-state business. Should a court make this deter-
39. Id. § 58.1-422(B) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
40. See id. § 58.1-422(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
41. Id. § 58.1-422(D) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
42. Id. § 58.1-422(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
43. Id.
44. See id. § 58.1-422(E) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
45. See, e.g., S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999); Kraft Gen. Foods,
Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71 (1992); Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner,
483 U.S. 266 (1987).
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mination, the employment requirement "shall not be deemed se-
verable" from the rest of Virginia Code section 58.1-422. 46
7. Minimum Tax on Noncorporate Telecommunication
Companies Restored
Corporations in Virginia are generally subject to a corporate
income tax instead of a gross receipts tax.4 However, since 1988
the Virginia Code has imposed a gross receipts-based minimum
tax on telecommunications companies in lieu of the corporate in-
come tax to ensure that Virginia receives a minimum amount of
tax from telecommunications companies. 48 The minimum tax on
telecommunications companies is applicable if the computed min-
imum tax exceeds the corporate income tax that a telecommuni-
cations company would pay.49 While the minimum tax statute is
located in the Virginia Code section applicable to the imposition
of income tax on corporations, the Virginia Department of Taxa-
tion also applied the minimum tax to telecommunications compa-
nies that were organized as noncorporate entities.50
On September 12, 2008, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that the minimum tax on telecommunications companies did not
apply to noncorporate companies.5' Subsequently, the 2009 Gen-
eral Assembly amended Virginia Code section 58.1-400.1 to make
the minimum tax apply to telecommunication companies that are
organized as noncorporate entities (i.e., a limited liability compa-
ny, partnership, corporation that has made an election under
subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, or other pass-through
entity),52 thereby legislatively overruling the supreme court's de-
cision.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-422(E) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
47. See id. § 58.1-400 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
48. See id. § 58.1-400.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
49. Id.
50. See 23 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 10-120-89 (1990). This regulation reconciled the statute,
which does not exclude noncorporate entities from the definition of "telecommunication
companies," with the fact that noncorporate entities are not liable for the corporate income
tax. The regulation provides that unless specifically exempt from the minimum tax, every
telecommunications company is subject to the minimum tax, even if the company is ex-
empt from the corporate income tax. Id.
51. Va. Cellular LLC v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 276 Va. 486, 492, 666 S.E.2d 374, 377
(2008).
52. Act of Mar. 6, 2009, ch. 152, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-400.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
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B. Recent Judicial Decision: Telecommunications Tax Applies
Only to Corporations
In Virginia Cellular LLC v. Virginia Department of Taxation,
the Supreme Court of Virginia overturned a trial court decision
and held that the minimum tax imposed on telecommunications
companies applies only to corporations and does not apply to
pass-through entities. 53 Virginia Cellular LLC ("Virginia Cellu-
lar"), a telecommunications company, conducted operations in
Virginia. 54 During the years 2001 through 2004, Virginia Cellular
filed the Telecommunications Companies Minimum Tax and Cre-
dit Schedule but reported no tax liability because it claimed it
was exempt from the tax as a pass-through entity. 5 Following an
audit of Virginia Cellular, the Virginia Department of Taxation
assessed the company with the minimum tax, plus penalties and
interest, for all four years.5 6 Virginia Cellular initiated a lawsuit
in the Richmond City Circuit Court claiming it was not subject to
the minimum tax on telecommunications companies. 57
The parties agreed that Virginia Cellular "was a telecommuni-
cations company as defined by [Virginia] Code [section] 58.1-
400.1(D) and that it was not a corporation, but rather a limited
liability company taxed as a partnership and pass-through entity
pursuant to Virginia income taxation laws."58 With no facts in
dispute, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment,
and the trial court held that Virginia Cellular was subject to the
minimum tax.5 9 On appeal to the supreme court, Virginia Cellular
argued that the plain meaning of the statute excluded pass-
through entities.6 0 The company also argued that title 23, section
10-120-89 of the Virginia Administrative Code-which provided
that the minimum tax was applicable to all telecommunications
companies, whether a corporation or a pass-through entity-was
invalid because it contradicted the plain meaning of the minimum
53. 276 Va. 486, 494, 666 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2008).
54. See id. at 489, 666 S.E.2d at 376.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 489-90, 666 S.E.2d at 376.
59. Id. at 490, 666 S.E.2d at 376.
60. Id.
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tax statute.' The supreme court agreed with Virginia Cellular's
arguments and reversed the trial court's decision.62 To arrive at
its decision, the supreme court employed the rules of statutory
construction to decipher the interaction between article 9 (pass-
through entities) and article 10 (corporations) of title 58.1 of the
Virginia Code, finding that the application of the minimum tax to
pass-through entities conflicted with the plain meaning of section
58.1-400.1.63 Final judgment was entered for Virginia Cellular.6 4
As discussed earlier in this article, the 2009 General Assembly
legislatively overruled the supreme court's decision in Virginia
Cellular when it amended Virginia Code section 58.1-400.1 to
specifically apply to corporations and pass-through entities.
6 5
III. RETAIL SALES AND USE TAX
A. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
1. Rules on Fabrication of Foodstuffs Changed
The 2009 General Assembly enacted an exemption to the Vir-
ginia retail sales and use tax on the fabrication of animal meat,
grains, vegetables, and other foodstuffs.6 6 The exemption applies
"when the purchaser.., supplies the foodstuffs and they are con-
sumed by the purchaser or his family . ",67 Prior to the adoption
of this exemption, fabrication labor was subject to the retail sales
and use tax pursuant to Virginia Code section 58.1-602, which
provides that the definition of a "sale" includes "the fabrication of
tangible personal property for consumers who furnish, either di-
rectly or indirectly, the materials used in fabrication."6 Subject-
ing fabrication labor to the sales and use tax caught many butch-
ers and foodstuffs handlers by surprise during field audits by the
61. See id.
62. See id. at 493, 666 S.E.2d at 378.
63. See id. at 490-93, 666 S.E.2d at 376-78.
64. Id. at 493, 666 S.E.2d at 378.
65. Act of Mar. 6, 2009, ch. 152, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-400.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
66. Act of Apr. 8, 2009, ch. 833, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-609.10(19) (Repl. Vol. 2009)); Act of Feb. 23, 2009, ch. 36, 2009 Va. Acts __
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.10(19) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.10(19) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
68. Id. § 58.1-602 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
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Virginia Department of Taxation because the meat or grain prod-
ucts had not been sold. For example, a hunter or farmer takes a
cow, pig, turkey, chicken, or deer carcass to a butcher to have the
meat processed into various cuts of meat for the customer's fami-
ly. The customer owns the meat product, and the butcher,
through his labor, fabricates the animal carcass into useable cuts
of meat. In this scenario, the butcher's labor charge was deemed
to be a retail sale and subject to Virginia sales tax.6 9 The new ex-
emption now excludes from the sales and use tax the fabrication
of animal meat, grains, vegetables, and other foodstuffs that are
provided by the customer and intended for consumption by the
customer or the customer's family. 0
The statute also exempts fabrication labor from the sales and
use tax when certain nonprofit entities provide the meat, grains,
vegetables, or other foodstuffs for their own use or when such
foodstuffs are donated to an organization exempt from income tax
under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4).7 1
2. Occasional Sale Exemption Expanded for Nonprofit
Organizations
Virginia provides an exemption from sales and use tax for "oc-
casional sales. '72 An occasional sale is defined as:
[A] sale of tangible personal property not held or used by a seller in
the course of an activity for which he is required to hold a certificate
of registration, including the sale or exchange of all or substantially
all the assets of any business and the reorganization or liquidation of
any business, provided such sale or exchange is not one of a series of
sales and exchanges sufficient in number, scope and character to
constitute an activity requiring the holding of a certificate of regis-
tration.
71
The issue frequently arises when a nonprofit organization con-
ducts fundraising activities such as seasonal sales, food and meal
69. The author has represented butchers who butchered the deer carcass into deer
steaks, stew meat, and similar products for the hunter and the hunter's family. In each
representation, the butcher presumed that his or her labor was a nontaxable service and
not a sale because the butcher never had title to the meat carcass which he or she but-
chered.
70. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-610(19) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
71. Id.
72. See id. § 58.1-609.10(2) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
73. Id. § 58.1-602 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
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sales, and similar activities more than three times per year. Does
the nonprofit organization have to register with the Virginia De-
partment of Taxation, become a dealer, and then collect and remit
sales tax on sales at its fundraising events?
The 2009 General Assembly decided to broaden the occasional
sales exemption for nonprofit organizations who are exempt from
sales and use tax on its own purchases, pursuant to Virginia Code
section 58.1-609.11, by providing an additional exemption for cer-
tain sales activities. 74 Specifically, the nonprofit organization will
qualify for the occasional sale exemption on its sales of (1) food,
prepared food, and meals and (2) tickets to events that include
the provision of food, prepared food, and meals, provided that
such sales take place less than twenty-four times per calendar
year.75
3. New Digital Media Fee Enacted
The 2009 General Assembly enacted a levy on in-room rentals
and purchases of movies, television shows, video games, and simi-
lar audio programming. 76 The fee is "equal to 10 percent of the
price of all in-room purchases or rentals of digital media in hotels,
motels, bed and breakfast establishments, inns, and other facili-
ties offering guest rooms rented out for continuous occupancy for
fewer than 90 consecutive days."77 While the new digital media
fee is not a sales and use tax, it is administered by the Virginia
Department of Taxation in the same manner as the sales and use
tax.7 8 The digital media fee will not apply to charges made for In-
ternet access or telephone service.7 9
74. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 338, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-609.10(2) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.10(2) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
76. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 531, 2009 Va. Acts __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
1731 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1731 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
78. See id. § 58.1-1732 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
79. Id. § 58.1-1731 (Repl. Vol. 2009). For additional guidance, see VA. DEPt OF TAXA-
TION, PUB. DOC. 09-71 (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.policylibrary.tax.virginia.
gov/OTP/Policy.nsf (follow "Tax Bulletins" hyperlink; then follow "2009" hyperlink; then
follow "VTB 09-5 (PD 09-71)" hyperlink).
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IV. STATE TAX ADMINISTRATION
The 2009 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-1834(B) to solidify the requirement that the Virginia De-
partment of Taxation provide to a taxpayer's representative, who
has filed a valid power of attorney form with the Department of
Taxation, copies of all correspondence, documentation, or other
materials related to the tax matter for which the power of attor-
ney has been filed.80 The copy or copies must be furnished to the
taxpayer's authorized representative named in the power of at-
torney at the same time the information is provided to the tax-
payer and under the same delivery method used.81 This require-
ment to provide or furnish documentation to the taxpayer's
authorized representative is designed to mirror the same practice
followed by the Internal Revenue Service.82 Over the past several
years, the Department of Taxation's compliance with providing
copies of correspondence and documentation to a taxpayer's au-
thorized representative under a power of attorney had become ir-
regular or sporadic at times. The Virginia legislature codified the
requirement to ensure that the taxpayer's power of attorney rece-
ives these documents and so that the Department of Taxation
may seek appropriations to fund the requirement.83
80. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 503, 2009 Va. Acts _ (to be codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-1834(B)). Chapter 503, clause 2 of the 2009 Acts of Assembly provides:
"[T]he provisions of this act shall not become effective unless an appropriation effectuating
the purposes of this act is included in the general appropriation act passed by the 2009
Regular Session of the General Assembly that becomes law." Id. While the appropriation
was not made, see H.B. 1600, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Apr.
8, 2009, ch. 781, 2009 Va. Acts _), the General Assembly nevertheless provided the mon-
ey to fund the provision. See REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE H. APPROPRIATIONS COMM. &
S. FIN. COMM., SUMMARY OF 2008-2010 BUDGET ACTIONS 48 (May 21, 2009).
81. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 503, 2009 Va. Acts - (to be codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-1834(B)).
82. See Treas. Reg. § 601.506(a) (2009).
83. The author was involved in getting this legislation passed on behalf of the Virginia
Bar Association's Taxation Section. The author participated in several meetings and tele-
phone conversations with various personnel from the Virginia Department of Taxation to
apprise them of the problems stemming from inconsistent communication and possible
ways to remedy the issue. This legislation is the result of these efforts. A special thanks is
given to J. Christian Tennant, Chair, VBA Taxation Section, for his leadership on this
matter.
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PART TWO: TAXES ADMINISTERED BY LOCALITIES
V. REAL PROPERTY
A. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
1. Incentives for Green Roofs Adopted
The 2009 General Assembly adopted a new statute that is de-
signed to provide incentives to encourage the use of green roofs.4
The statute authorizes local governments to "grant incentives or
provide regulatory flexibility to encourage the use of green roofs
in the construction, repair, or remodeling of residential and com-
mercial buildings." 5 The incentives and regulatory flexibility pro-
visions are to be provided through local ordinances adopted by
the county, city, or town as appropriate.8 6 A "green roof' is defined
in the statute to mean a solar roof or a vegetative roof. 7 A "solar
roof' is defined as "a solar roofing system that generates reusable
energy, which reusable energy accounts for at least 2.5 percent of
the total electric energy used by the building to which the solar
roofing system is attached."88 A "vegetative roof' is "a roofing sys-
tem designed in accordance with the Virginia Stormwater Man-
agement Program's standards and specifications for green
roofs ... in which at least 50 percent of the total roofing area is
vegetative."8 9 The incentives and regulatory flexibility provisions
are not defined but may include a reduction in permit fees, a
streamlined process for the approval of building permits when
green roofs are used, or a reduction in any gross receipts tax on
green roof contactors as defined by the locality's ordinance. 9o
84. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 604, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
3852 (Repl. Vol. 2009)); Act of Feb. 23, 2009, ch. 17, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3852 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3852(B) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
86. See id.
87. Id. § 58.1-3852(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 58.1-3852(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
2009]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
2. Agricultural Use Real Estate
The 2009 General Assembly relaxed the rules applicable to as-
sessments relating to real estate devoted to agricultural use, hor-
ticultural use, and open-space use.9' The amended statute pro-
vides that real property that otherwise qualifies for agricultural,
horticultural, forest, or open-space use assessment will not be
disqualified from such favorable special land use classification
because a portion of such property is being used for a different
purpose pursuant to a special use permit or as otherwise allowed
by zoning.9 2 The portion of the property being used for a different
purpose will be deemed to be a separate piece of real property for
purposes of assessment.93 The presence of utility lines, zoning de-
signations, and special use permits will not be considered in de-
termining whether the property is devoted to agricultural, horti-
cultural, forest, or open-space use.94
B. Recent Significant Judicial Decisions
1. Designation of Property Tax Exemption for Religious
Organization Upheld
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld a property tax exemp-
tion for a religious organization when it overturned the decision
of the Botetourt County Circuit Court in Virginia Baptist Homes,
Inc. v. Botetourt County.95 Virginia Baptist Homes, Inc. ("VBH")
was formed as a non-stock, not-for-profit corporation in 1946 by
the Baptist General Association of Virginia "to provide a home for
aged Baptists in Virginia."96 In 1976, the General Assembly clas-
sified VBH as a tax-exempt corporation, thereby exempting its
personal and real property from ad valorem taxation so long as
the property was used in accordance with VBH's purpose.97 Bote-
tourt County ("County") argued at trial that VBH strayed from its
original purpose when it opened a new residential home for the
91. See Act of Apr. 8, 2009, ch. 800, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3230 (Repl. 2009)).
92. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3230 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. 276 Va. 656, 669, 668 S.E.2d 119, 125 (2008).
96. Id. at 659, 668 S.E.2d at 120.
97. Id.
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elderly that was open to all residents regardless of their religious
beliefs.98 Furthermore, the County argued that residents were on-
ly accepted to the new facility upon proof that the prospective res-
ident could pay for all costs of residing at the home, suggesting a
lack of benevolence on the part of VBH. 99 The trial court held for
the County and denied VBH the property tax exemption for its
new residential community facility.100
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court examined the
plain meaning of Virginia Code section 58.1-3650.33(A), which
suggested that when the General Assembly adopted the property
tax exemption for VBH in 1976, the legislature "considered oper-
ating retirement homes for the elderly to qualify as a religious
purpose."10 The court did not question the legislature's determi-
nation and, therefore, only addressed whether VBH's new retire-
ment community operated on a nonprofit basis. 0 2 The court noted
that there was no evidence in the record that the new retirement
community conducted any service other than its operation as a
retirement community for the elderly.0 3 No other functions or
commercial ventures were performed on the premises of the re-
tirement community. Therefore, "[gliving deference to the legis-
lative designation," the court held that the retirement community
was used for religious purposes and entered final judgment for
VBH.105
2. Manifest Error May Be Established by Showing Real Property
Is Assessed at More Than Fair Market Value
In an appeal involving numerous applications for relief from an
alleged erroneous assessment of real property taxes on multiple
parcels of real estate situated in a business park, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that in order to show manifest error, the
taxpayers did not have to prove what information the taxing au-
98. See id. at 660-62, 668 S.E.2d at 120-21.
99. See id. at 661, 668 S.E.2d at 121.
100. Id. at 662, 668 S.E.2d at 121. For a complete discussion of the trial court's decision
in this case, see Craig D. Bell, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation, 43 U. RICH. L.
REV. 405, 424-27 (2008).
101. See Va. Baptist Homes, 276 Va. at 668, 668 S.E.2d at 125.
102. Id. at 669, 668 S.E.2d at 125.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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thority considered and how it arrived at the challenged assess-
ments.'0 6 The court also ruled that when a locality determines the
fair market value of a parcel of property, the presumption of cor-
rectness will not be rebutted solely on a prior sale of the parcel in
which the parcel was a small part of a bulk land purchase. 107
West Creek Associates, LLC v. County of Goochland involved
144 separate limited liability companies (collectively referred to
as "West Creek") that purchased approximately 2,500 acres of
real estate located in the West Creek Business Park in Goochland
County ("County"). °8 Each company was only conveyed a small
portion, but the total purchase price for the 144 separate parcels
was approximately $34.1 million. 0 9 Prior to this sale, the County
assessed the 2,500 acres as twenty separate parcels with a total
value of $54.8 million.11° In 2001, one year after West Creek pur-
chased the property, the County performed a quadrennial reas-
sessment and classified the 2,500 acres as 144 separate parcels to
reflect the 144 recorded deeds.", Forty of the parcels were as-
sessed a value of $35,000 per acre while most of the remaining
parcels were assessed at $75,000 per acre. 1 2 Thus, the 2001 total
assessed value of the 144 parcels was $105.4 million.1 3
West Creek claimed that the assessed value substantially ex-
ceeded the property's fair market value and challenged the as-
sessment in the Goochland County Circuit Court."4 After West
Creek presented its case, the County moved to strike the evi-
dence, asserting that "West Creek had failed to establish a suffi-
cient record from which the circuit court could conclude that the
County had assessed the relevant parcels in violation of [Virginia]
Code [section] 58.1-3984.""' The County argued that West Creek
only proved how the appraiser valued the real estate but failed to
demonstrate how the County's Board of Assessors used that in-
106. W. Creek Assocs., LLC v. County of Goochland, 276 Va. 393, 397, 665 S.E.2d 834,
836 (2008).
107. See id. at 415, 665 S.E.2d at 846.
108. Id. at 397-98, 665 S.E.2d at 836.
109. Id. at 398, 665 S.E.2d at 836.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 398-99, 665 S.E.2d at 836.
113. Id. at 398, 665 S.E.2d at 836.
114. See id. at 399, 665 S.E.2d at 837.
115. Id. at 402-03, 665 S.E.2d at 839.
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formation.116 In addition, the County claimed that West Creek
"did not show what information the [Board of Equalization] con-
sidered in making the adjustments to the assessments set by the
[Board of Assessors]."," The circuit court granted the County's
motion to strike the evidence regarding the forty parcels assessed
at $35,000 per acre on the basis that West Creek "presented no
evidence [as to] the 'manner' in which the County arrived at the
assessment... nor any evidence from which it could infer the me-
thodology used.", ' , As to the remaining parcels, the circuit court
overruled the County's motion to strike, 119 but at trial the court
held that West Creek had not established manifest error because
it had not shown "what information the assessing authority had,
how that evidence was considered and weighed," or the basis for
the assessment. 21
West Creek appealed the circuit court's decision to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia. 2' The supreme court determined that
the lower court had improperly granted the County's motion to
strike the evidence as to the parcels valued at $35,000 per acre. 12
The supreme court stated that it has "never explicitly held that
manifest error cannot be established simply by evidence showing
that real property is assessed at more than its fair market val-
ue." 23 In the opinion, the court cited several cases where manifest
error was demonstrated by presenting evidence that the real
property was assessed with a value higher than the fair market
value.124
For the remaining parcels, the court determined that West
Creek had not presented credible evidence of fair market value
with regard to the contested assessments on the parcels.' 25 West
116. Id. at 403, 665 S.E.2d at 839.
117. Id.
118. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id.
120. See id. at 407-08, 665 S.E.2d at 841-42.
121. Id. at 408, 665 S.E.2d at 842.
122. Id. at 418, 665 S.E.2d at 848.
123. Id. at 414, 665 S.E.2d at 845.
124. See id. at 413, 665 S.E.2d at 845 (citing City of Martinsville v. Commonwealth
Boulevard Assocs., LLC, 268 Va. 697, 699-700, 604 S.E.2d 69, 70-71 (2004); Fray v. Coun-
ty of Culpeper, 212 Va. 148, 151, 183 S.E.2d 175, 178 (1971); City of Harrisonburg v.
Taubman, 212 Va. 28, 30, 181 S.E.2d 654, 656 (1971); Washington County Nat'l Bank v.
Washington County, 176 Va. 216, 222, 10 S.E.2d 515, 518 (1940)).
125. See id. at 417, 665 S.E.2d at 847.
20091
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Creek had claimed that the bulk sale price demonstrated fair
market value.'26 The supreme court disagreed, stating that a "re-
cent sale price of real property is 'merely one of the factors to be
taken into consideration' when determining whether such proper-
ty has been assessed at more than fair market value."127 While the
sale price of a property is given substantial weight, it is not con-
clusive evidence of a property's fair market value.1 28 Accordingly,
the court held that "West Creek did not carry its burden of show-
ing that the parcels [were] assessed at more than fair market
value," because the evidence it presented "did not rebut the pre-
sumption of correctness afforded the assessments.' 29
C. Recent Significant Opinion of the Attorney General
The Dinwiddie County Attorney inquired as to "whether a
county board of supervisors may prevent an assessor for a general
reassessment from complying with [Virginia Code section] 58.1-
3300, which governs reassessment records, on the sole basis that
the board of supervisors disagrees with the results of such gener-
al reassessment.' 130 In response, the Attorney General opined that
"a county board of supervisors may not prevent a statutorily ap-
pointed professional assessor for a general reassessment from
complying with [Virginia Code section] 58.1-3300 on the sole ba-
sis that the board disagrees with the results of such reassess-
ment."'13 Applying Dillon's Rule, 32 the Attorney General stated:
The General Assembly has not authorized a county to appoint an as-
sessor to begin to undertake the general reassessment process and
then prevent such assessor from complying with the requirements of
§ 58.1-3300 because the county's board of supervisors disagrees with
the reassessment results. Prior opinions of the Attorney General si-
milarly conclude that a board of supervisors has no power to change
126. See id. at 414-15, 665 S.E.2d at 846.
127. Id. at 415, 665 S.E.2d at 846 (quoting Am. Viscose Corp. v. City of Roanoke, 205
Va. 192, 196, 135 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1964)).
128. Id. (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 417-18, 665 S.E.2d at 847.
130. Op. to John C. Blair, II, Dinwiddie County Attorney (Mar. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.oag.state.va.us/OPINIONS/2009opns/09-008-Blair.pdf.
131. Id.
132. "[Dillon's Riule provides that municipal corporations have only those powers that
are expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied from expressly granted powers,
and those that are essential and indispensable. When a local ordinance exceeds the scope
of this authority, the ordinance is invalid." Bd. of Supervisors v. Countrywide Inv. Co., 258
Va. 497, 503, 522 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
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the assessment of real property as ascertained by the assessor dur-
ing a general reassessment and has no authority to raise or lower
the ratio of assessment of real property.'33
VI. TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
A. Recent Significant Legislative Activity
1. Exemption for Certified Pollution Control Equipment and
Facilities
The 2009 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-3660 to exempt certified pollution control equipment and fa-
cilities from state and local taxation, removing the option for lo-
calities to determine whether or not to offer the exemption from
local taxes. 34 The statewide exemption will go into effect for tax
years beginning after 2010.13 The statute specifically carves out
from the exemption the land on which the facilities and equip-
ment are located.136
2. Precision Investment Castings Separate Classification for
Machinery and Tools Tax
The 2009 General Assembly enacted Virginia Code section
58.1-3508.3, which creates a separate classification for local prop-
erty taxation for "machinery and tools used directly in the manu-
facture of precision investment castings.""37 Local governments
may tax this new precision investment castings classification at
rates or assessment ratios that are less than those for other ma-
chinery and tools.138
133. Op. to John C. Blair, II, supra note 130.
134. Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 671, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3660(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
135. See Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 671, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660 ed. note (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
136. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660(B) (Rep. Vol. 2009).
137. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 528, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
3508.3 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3508.3 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
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3. Separate Property Classification for Electric Vehicles
The 2009 General Assembly created a separate classification
for local property tax purposes for "motor vehicles powered solely
by electricity."13 9
B. Recent Significant Judicial Decision on Business Property
Valuation
The Hopewell City Circuit Court addressed the issue of wheth-
er independent appraisals of value of business property, provided
by the taxpayer, must be considered by the local taxing authority
when assessing the fair market value of machinery and tools
property.1 40 The taxpayer, Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honey-
well"), owned and operated a manufacturing facility in Hopewell,
Virginia.14 Consequently, the machinery and tools in the Hope-
well facility were subject to the machinery and tools tax pursuant
to Virginia Code section 58.1-3507.142 The Commissioner of the
Revenue for the City of Hopewell ("City") assessed Honeywell a
machinery and tools tax of $2,610,789.56 for 2002 and
$2,485,852.30 for 2003.143 Each of the City's assessments were
based on a net original capitalized cost as reported by Honeywell
on its tax returns for the respective year.144
While Honeywell timely paid its 2002 tax assessment, it filed
an amended 2003 tax return after receiving the Commissioner's
assessment and reported a much lower net adjusted original capi-
talized cost for its machinery and tools. 41 Honeywell then reas-
sessed the tax on the machinery and tools based on its amended
2003 tax return and timely paid that lower assessment.'46
Honeywell also filed applications for correction of its 2002 and
2003 assessments with the City "on the grounds that the valua-
139. Act of Feb. 23, 2009, ch. 44, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3506(A)(40) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
140. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. City of Hopewell, No. CL06-438, slip op. at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 26, 2008) (Hopewell City) (order overruling demurrer).
141. Id. slip op. at 2.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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tion of the taxable machinery and tools exceeded fair market val-
ue."'47 The City denied both applications for corrections.148 In re-
sponse to the City's denial of the application for correction of the
2003 assessment, Honeywell filed an administrative appeal to the
State Tax Commissioner, who ultimately denied Honeywell's ap-
peal." 9
In connection with its administrative assessment appeals, Ho-
neywell engaged independent appraisal companies to value its
machinery and tools as of January 1, 2002 and January 1, 2003.150
Both appraisals found the fair market value of the machinery and
tools to be far less than the values established by the City's
Commissioner of the Revenue, which were based on net original
capitalized cost for the machinery and tools and not the fair mar-
ket value. 15' The independent appraisal determined that the Jan-
uary 1, 2002, fair market value of the machinery and tools was
$76,471,000, a value approximately $9,700,000 lower than the
City's assessed value."52 As of January 1, 2003, the fair market
value was appraised at $71,854,000, which was also approximate-
ly $9,700,000 lower than the City's 2003 assessment.' 53
Honeywell filed a Complaint and Application for Correction of
Erroneous Assessments in the Hopewell City Circuit Court, ar-
guing that "the City's choice of valuation methods produce[d] an
impermissible result" under the Constitution of Virginia.TM Article
X, section 2 of the constitution requires all assessments of tangi-
ble personal property, including machinery and tools, to be at fair
market value.' 55 Honeywell also argued that the City could con-
sider Honeywell's independent appraisal "to the extent that it
casts doubt upon the accuracy of the percentage of original total
capitalized cost method" the City used to reach the fair market
value of the various items of tangible personal property."6
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Id. slip op. at 1, 5.
155. VA. CONST. art. X, § 2.
156. Honeywell, slip op. at 5.
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The City filed a demurrer in response to Honeywell's com-
plaint, asserting three grounds upon which the demurrer could be
granted.157 First, the City asserted that Honeywell's proposed me-
thod to determine the taxable value of the machinery and tools
was a method not authorized by law.'58 Second, the City argued
that "valuing Honeywell's machinery and tools using the me-
thod advocated by Honeywell would violate the Virginia constitu-
tional requirement of uniformity of taxation."'59 Third, the City
contended that Honeywell's claim regarding the 2002 assessment
was untimely. 160
In support of its demurrer, the City argued that only two valu-
ation methods are available to the Commissioner of the Revenue
under Virginia Code section 58.1-3507(B): (1) depreciated cost or
(2) a percentage or percentages of original total capitalized cost
excluding capitalized interest.' According to the City, using an
independent appraisal would violate this statute. 62 Honeywell
contended that it did not want the independent appraisals to be
used as a method of assessment, but, instead, that the appraisals
should "serve as factual evidence used to demonstrate that the
property was assessed in excess of fair market value." 63 Accord-
ingly, the City may consider such independent appraisals in cir-
cumstances when an assessment is challenged.16 The circuit court
agreed with Honeywell, finding that "a locality may consider an
independent appraisal and other evidence offered by the taxpayer
to determine if the locality's assessments for the property in dis-
pute reflect fair market value."165
The circuit court also ruled that consideration of an indepen-
dent appraisal does not violate the uniformity requirement under
the Constitution of Virginia.166 The court noted that since all tax-
payers subject to the machinery and tools tax had an equal oppor-
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. At the hearing on the demurrer, the City conceded that Honeywell's 2002 as-
sessment claim was timely. Id. slip. op. at 5 n.4.
161. Id. slip op. at 5 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3507(B) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
162. See id.
163. Id. slip op. at 6.
164. Id.
165. Id. slip op. at 7.
166. Id. slip op. at 8.
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tunity to challenge the fair market value of the assessment, the
uniformity requirement was satisfied.67 Thus, the court held:
[Tihe Commissioner is permitted to consider such independent ap-
praisals to assist her in making a factual determination of whether
the property was assessed at fair market value upon a challenge by
the taxpayer that it was not. However, [the Commissioner] may not
substitute the fair market value stated in an independent appraisal
as the assessed value of the property as that would violate Va. Code
§ 58.1-3507(B). 168
The circuit court also ruled that a court may similarly consider
independent appraisals in determining whether a property was
assessed at fair market value.1 69 When the taxpayer proves an er-
roneous assessment, the court must decide the fair market value
of the property based on the evidence before the court, including
the taxpayer's independent appraisal.'70 The court relied on Vir-
ginia Code sections 58.1-3507(B) and 58.1-3987 to reach its deci-
sion.1'7 Section 58.1-3507(B) specifically authorizes the commis-
sioner of the revenue, in valuing machinery and tools, to consider
any bona fide independent appraisal presented by the taxpayer. 172
Subsequently, section 58.1-3987
vests the Court not only with the Commissioner's powers and duties
as of the time of assessment, but also with "all powers and duties
conferred by law upon such authority between the time such as-
sessment was made and the time such application is heard." Thus,
the Court ... has not only the power, but also the duty, to review in-
dependent appraisals. 
17
Thus, the City's demurrer was overruled by the court.174
C. Recent Significant Opinion of the Attorney General
Senator Emmett Hanger asked the Attorney General to define
the meaning of the term "original cost" as it is used in Virginia
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. See id. slip op. at 9.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3507(B) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
173. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3987 (Repl. Vol. 2009)) (internal citation omit-
ted).
174. Id. slip op. at 10.
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Code section 58.1-3503(A)(17).'' 5 This section of the Virginia Code
provides that, for valuation purposes, "[aill tangible personal
property employed in a trade or business.., shall be valued by
means of a percentage or percentages of original cost."1'7 6
Senator Hanger suggested that "the original cost of personal
property employed in a trade or business could be defined as ei-
ther the price paid for the personal property when it originally
was purchased from a manufacturer or dealer or the price paid by
a subsequent purchaser.1 71 Senator Hanger also observed that
Virginia Code section 58.1-3503(A)(17) does not define "original
cost."17
In response, the Attorney General opined that the meaning of
the term "original cost" is "the cost of the personal property em-
ployed in a trade or business paid by the owner who first pur-
chased the personal property from either a manufacturer or deal-
er.'' 79 Effectively, if a business purchases a piece of used
equipment, the equipment's value will be based on its cost when
it was purchased by the original owner, not the cost to the current
owner who purchased the equipment used.180
This opinion will likely prevent businesses from using a sales-
leaseback transaction to reduce the value of their equipment.
Previously, many businesses may have considered selling their
equipment to a capital firm at an appraised price of its current
value and leasing the equipment as a method of reducing their
basis for business tangible personal property tax purposes. This
opinion likely means that Virginia localities will not recognize the
new appraised value in such a transaction for business tangible
personal property tax purposes.
D. Recent Significant Opinion of the Virginia Tax Commissioner
In what appears to be a change in policy, the Virginia Tax
Commissioner ruled, in an advisory opinion, that the intangible
175. Op. to Hon. Emmett W. Hanger, Jr. (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://oag.state.
va.us/OPINIONS/2009opns/08-109-Hanger.pdf.
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3503(A)(17) (Repl. Vol. 2009) (emphasis added).
177. Op. to Hon. Emmett W. Hanger, Jr., supra note 175.
178. Id.
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. See id.
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personal property classification provided for manufacturers in
Virginia Code section 58.1-1101(A)(2) does not extend to a single-
member limited liability company that is classified as a disre-
garded entity for federal and Virginia income tax purposes."8 ' In
this ruling, the taxpayer was in the business of natural gas explo-
ration and extraction. 8" The taxpayer wholly owned a limited lia-
bility company ("LLC"), and the LLC owned an aircraft used by
the taxpayer's employees for business purposes, including flights
to locations where the taxpayer owned natural gas wells.13 The
LLC had no other property, payroll, or expenses, and all of the
aircraft's operational and maintenance expenses were paid by the
taxpayer. 84 The aircraft, which was housed in a hanger at a local
airport, was never used to transport natural gas.' 85 The taxpayer
raised three questions concerning the application of the business
tangible personal property ("BTPP") tax to the aircraft. 186
The first question the taxpayer raised was whether natural gas
exploration and extraction was considered "mining" for purposes
of the BTPP tax.87 The Tax Commissioner determined that the
extraction of natural gas is included in the term "mining" for the
purposes of Virginia Code section 58.1-1101(A)(2), which classi-
fies certain tangible personal property as intangible personal
property for state taxation purposes.88 While the Virginia Code
does not define the term "mining," the Tax Commissioner referred
to Black's Law Dictionary, which defines "mining" as "[tihe
process of extracting ore or mineral from the ground; the working
of a mine ... [t]his term also encompasses oil and gas drilling." 89
Additionally, the Tax Commissioner noted that the Supreme
181. VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION PUB. DOC. 09-22 (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.
policylibrary.tax.virginia.gov/OTP/policy.nsf (follow "Rulings of the Tax Commissioner"
hyperlink; then follow "2009" hyperlink; then follow "PD 09-22" hyperlink) [hereinafter
TAX RULING].
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1101(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
189. TAX RULING, supra note 181 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1016 (8th ed.
2004)).
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Court of Virginia has held the term "mineral" to include all petro-
leum, oil, and gas.1 90
The second question raised by the taxpayer was whether the
aircraft, as used by the taxpayer, was subject to the machinery
and tools tax.191 Virginia Code section 58.1-3507 subjects the ma-
chinery and tools of a mining business to local taxation. 192 The
Tax Commissioner determined that "[u]nless an aircraft owned
by a mining company is used to transport any of the materials
that were mined, [it is] highly unlikely that it could be classified
as property subject to the [machinery and tools] tax."' 93 In this
case, the aircraft was used to transport employees and was not
considered to be machinery and tools subject to local taxation. 94
The third, and final, question presented by the taxpayer in-
quired as to whether the LLC's ownership of the aircraft affected
the aircraft's classification for BTPP purposes. 9' The Tax Com-
missioner confirmed a prior ruling which held that "the exemp-
tion provided for manufacturers in Va. Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2)
does not extend to separate legal entities that perform no manu-
facturing activities."196 However, in this earlier ruling, the Tax
Commissioner also determined that a wholly owned corporate af-
filiate of a taxpayer that held a certificate of incorporation from
the State Corporation Commission ("SCC") and had its own fed-
eral employer identification number ("FEIN") for federal income
tax purposes was considered a separate taxable entity from the
other members of its corporate family for BTPP tax purposes. 97
However, if the exemption for manufacturers does not extend
to separate legal entities that perform no manufacturing activi-
ties, why did the Tax Commissioner bother discussing vertical in-
tegration, the SCC certificate of incorporation, and the affiliate's
FEIN if those facts made no difference in the outcome?
190. Id. (citing Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 166 Va. 524, 525, 529, 186 S.E. 20,
21-22 (1936)).
191. Id.
192. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3507 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
193. TAX RULING, supra note 181.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION PUB. Doc. 07-191 (Nov. 21, 2007) available at
http://www.policylibrary.tax.virginia.gov/OTP/policy.nsf (follow "Rulings of the Tax Com-
mission" hyperlink; then follow "PD 07-191" hyperlink) [hereinafter TAX RULING].
197. TAX RULING, supra note 196.
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VII. BUSINESS PROFESSIONAL OCCUPATION LICENSE TAX
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the City of Lynchburg
("City") could not impose a tax on gross receipts for services per-
formed by the taxpayer in other Virginia localities, despite not be-
ing taxed by the other localities. 198 English Construction Compa-
ny, Inc. and W.C. English, Inc. (collectively referred to as
"English") were construction contractors with a principal place of
business in Lynchburg. 199 English also maintained definite places
of business in other localities. 200 In City of Lynchburg v. English
Construction Co., the City argued that under Virginia Code sec-
tion 58.1-3715(A), it could assess gross receipts that were not
taxed by the other localities because English has its principal
place of business in Lynchburg.201 Accordingly, the City assessed
English with its business, professional, and occupation license
("BPOL") tax on all of the gross receipts English received from
projects in other localities that were not subject to a BPOL tax in
those localities. 20 2 English initiated its lawsuit challenging the
City's assessment on its BPOL receipts received, but not taxed, in
the other localities. 20 3 After the circuit court held that the City
had no express statutory authority to support the challenged as-
sessments, the City filed an appeal with the Supreme Court of
Virginia. 20 4
The supreme court agreed with the circuit court that the Vir-
ginia Code did not provide the City with any authority to tax
English's gross receipts earned in other localities, asserting that a
local governing body must have clear statutory authority to im-
pose a tax. °5 To support its holding, the supreme court noted that
Virginia Code section 58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(a) specifies as a general
rule for BPOL purposes that "the gross receipts to be included in
the taxable measure shall be only those attributable to 'the exer-
cise of a privilege subject to licensure at a definite place of busi-
198. City of Lynchburg v. English Constr. Co., 277 Va. 574, 584, 675 S.E.2d 197, 202
(2009).
199. Id. at 578, 675 S.E.2d at 199.
200. See id. at 579, 675 S.E.2d at 199.
201. Id. at 578, 675 S.E.2d at 199.
202. Id. at 578-79, 675 S.E.2d at 199.
203. Id. at 579, 675 S.E.2d at 199.
204. Id. For a complete discussion of the trial court's decision, see Craig D. Bell, An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 405, 431-33 (2008).
205. See English Constr. Co., 277 Va. at 583-84, 675 S.E.2d at 202.
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ness within [the] jurisdiction."'2 °6 Furthermore, Virginia Code sec-
tion 58.1-3715 "contains no language granting the City authority
to levy a tax on gross receipts from services performed by a con-
tractor in other localities in which he has a definite place of busi-
ness."20 7 While asserting that the City sought such authority by
implication,208 the supreme court refused to recognize any author-
ity to impose the tax by implication and noted that the City's in-
terpretation of the Virginia Code "ignores the clear legislative in-
tent underlying the General Assembly's 1996 revision of the
business license tax laws."20 9
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS LOCAL TAXES
A. Priority in Claims for Setoff Against Tax Refunds Established
The 2009 General Assembly enacted legislation that establish-
es classifications for determining the priority of multiple claims to
federal, state, and local personal income tax refunds for purposes
of debt setoff.210 Virginia Code section 58.1-530 classifies the
claims to be set off and prioritizes them as follows:
1. Claims of the [Virginia] Department [of Taxation];
2. Claims filed by the Department of Social Services, Division of
Child Support Enforcement;
3. Claims filed by any court or other administrative unit of state
government;
4. Claims filed by any county, city, or town; and
5. Claims filed by the Internal Revenue Service."
Under the new priority setoff legislation, claims within the
same classification are determined by the order in which the
claimant agency has filed a written notice with the Virginia De-
partment of Taxation of its intent to effect collection through se-
toff.212 Section 58.1-530 further provides that "[c]laims filed by
counties, cities, and towns for an offset of federal income tax re-
206. Id. at 583, 675 S.E.2d at 201 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3703.1(A)(3)(a) (Repl.
Vol. 2009)).
207. Id. at 583-84, 675 S.E.2d at 202.
208. Id. at 584, 675 S.E.2d at 202.
209. Id.
210. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 571, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-530 (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
211. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-530 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
212. Id.
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funds are limited to claims for delinquent local taxes. 2 13 However,
this new setoff legislation will not become effective until the effec-
tive date of legislation passed by the U.S. Congress that would al-
low local governments to collect delinquent local tax debts using
offsets from federal income tax refunds.1 4
B. New Exemptions from Local Meals Tax
The 2009 General Assembly created a series of new exemptions
from the local meals tax and county food and beverage tax.215 Ex-
amples of the new exemptions include the meals, food, and beve-
rages: (1) sold by restaurants to employees as part of their com-
pensation; (2) sold by schools to their students or employees; (3)
sold by hospitals and extended care facilities to patients; (4) sold
by day care centers; (5) sold by homes for the aged, infirm, handi-
capped, battered women, narcotic addicts, or alcoholics; (6) sold
by age-restricted apartment complexes or residences when in-
cluded in rental fees; (7) when used or consumed and paid for by
the Commonwealth, any political subdivision of the Common-
wealth, or the United States; (8) provided by a public or private
nonprofit charitable organization to elderly, blind, handicapped,
or needy persons; and (9) provided by private establishments that
contract with the appropriate agency to elderly, infirm, blind,
handicapped, or needy persons.26
The legislation also expands the tax exemptions to include
meals, food, and beverages sold as a fundraising activity-not to
exceed three times per year-by volunteer fire departments and
rescue squads, churches and other educational and charitable or-
ganizations.2 1 7 Additionally, the local meals tax exemptions were
amended to include meals served by churches to their members
"as a regular part of their religious observances." 28 Food and bev-
213. Id.
214. See Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 571, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-530 ed. note (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
215. Act. of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 415, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 58.1-3833(A), -3840(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
216. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3833(A), -3840(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
217. See id.
218. Id. § 58.1-3840(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
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erages sold by churches to their members were already exempt
from the county food and beverage tax.219
C. Recordation Tax Civil and Criminal Penalties
The 2009 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-812(C) to increase the criminal penalty for "[a]ny person who
knowingly misrepresents the consideration for the interest in
property conveyed by a deed or other instrument or any of the
other information requested by the clerk of the court" to a Class 1
misdemeanor. 20 The legislation also provides that "[i]f an unders-
tatement of the consideration is false or fraudulent with the in-
tent to evade a tax, a penalty equal to 100 percent of the tax due
on the understatement shall be added to the amount of the tax
due," plus accrued interest until the time the tax is paid. 221
219. See id. § 58.1-3833(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008); Id. § 35.1-25(5) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
220. Act. of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 686, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-812(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009)); Act of Feb. 25, 2009, ch. 95, 2009 Va. Acts __ (codi-
fied as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-812(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-812(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
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